Immigration for realists: how we misread the public and the evidence, and how to do better

Immigration experts have never known more, and rarely mattered less. Restrictionist parties and arguments have become increasingly influential across immigrant-receiving democracies, even as the expert consensus on immigration's benefits has grown more confident. I argue that we, immigration scholars and practitioners, have ourselves contributed to this gap. First, we misread the public: most voters are neither committed xenophobes nor dormant cosmopolitans. Rather, they are conditional supporters willing to accept immigration they see as beneficial to their country. Their underlying preferences are strikingly stable, with opponents usually caring more about the issue than supporters. Second, we misrepresent the evidence on immigration's costs and benefits through selective framing and strategic omission. While the effects of freer human mobility are generally positive, these findings come with qualifications that experts often leave out. Voters who notice a mismatch with their experience have good reason to distrust us, which damages the case for immigration regardless of what the populist far right does. I argue for an immigration realism that takes voters' preferences seriously and reports inconvenient evidence as readily as favourable evidence. Instead of trying to change opponents' minds, we should put more effort into designing demonstrably beneficial policy compromises that can retain majority support.