Drone Threats to Nuclear Installations During Armed Conflict: Risk-Based Protection Strategies

The growing use of unmanned aircraft systems in armed conflict has created new nuclear security challenges for nuclear installations. Drones may support surveillance, unauthorized airspace intrusion, smuggling, operational disruption, and attacks on supporting infrastructure. Their small size, low-altitude operation, increasing autonomy, and evolving payload capacity complicate detection, attribution, and timely response. Fiber-optic-controlled drones add a further challenge because they can reduce the effectiveness of conventional counter-drone measures, particularly radio-frequency detection, jamming, and operator geolocation. This study examines drone threats to nuclear installations during armed conflict and proposes a risk-based framework for strengthening nuclear security resilience. Using a qualitative approach based on international nuclear security guidance, counter-drone literature, and documented conflict-related cases, the framework assesses risk through four variables: threat likelihood, vulnerability, consequence, and protection readiness. The framework is applied to incidents involving the Zaporizhzhia and Chornobyl nuclear facilities. The study finds that effective protection requires layered detection, integrated counter-drone procedures, resilient safety and security systems, legal preparedness, and coordinated response among operators, regulators, law enforcement, military authorities, aviation agencies, and emergency services. The paper contributes a non-sensitive analytical model for evaluating and managing drone threats to nuclear installations in conflict environments.