The autonomy–abandonment dilemma: Why umbrella states oppose their nuclear patron

Abstract Why do small states in asymmetric alliances oppose their nuclear security guarantor? This article examines the decision-making process behind Norway’s proposal to establish a Nordic nuclear weapon free zone in 1981 and argues for a new theoretical framework, the autonomy–abandonment dilemma, to understand how small states manage their alliance membership. Norway’s proposal led Alexander Haig, then-US Secretary of State, to threaten the US withdrawal of Norway’s security guarantee. Examining the bargaining process reveals how a small state accidentally breaks the balance between autonomy and abandonment. Importantly, the case has implications for how we interpret a state’s intentions based on the outcome of a specific policy. What at first glance appeared as free riding was, on inspection, the result of not cynical exploitation of the nuclear patron but rather domestic bargaining. The policy’s strategic implications resulted from management of the conflict between strategic considerations and domestic political pressures.