Anolis: A Censorship-Resistant Anonymous Communication System with Zero-Knowledge Streaming Settlements and Asymmetric Rendezvous

Low-latency anonymous communication has long faced a set of structural contradictions: Tor-style networks rely on covertly distributed directories and unpaid volunteer nodes, making it hard to resist directory blocking and lacking sustainable node incentives; mix networks such as Nym and Lokinet, which maintain topology and incentives on public ledgers, mitigate global passive monitoring but expose gateways and relay endpoints to active censors' traversal blocking; and paying for transport service under the premise of anonymity means that the payment behavior itself may leave linkable traces between the communicating parties. This paper proposes Anolis, a peer-to-peer anonymous communication system driven by economic incentives and requiring no centralized services. The two communicating parties each build a multi-hop relay node chain and splice them into a bidirectional chained-proxy channel at a rendezvous point, with neither end knowing the other's network location or real identity; rendezvous signaling is anchored on blockchain consensus, exploiting the asynchrony of on-chain confirmation to decouple the two sides' connection-establishment timing and raise the cost of traffic-correlation attacks at the rendezvous phase; zero-knowledge streaming payment proofs hide payment contents and channel parameters while allowing either the payer or the relay to settle at any time, without trusted third-party arbitration; relay endpoints are not on-chain and can only be discovered through paid channels, raising the cost for attackers to enumerate nodes and launch traversal blocking; a pluggable transport layer mitigates deep-packet-inspection fingerprints. Paid service replaces the volunteer model: relays may provide service only after staking-based registration, and behavioral violations are absorbed by the guaranteed service fee and market reputation, so that relay supply sustains itself while nodes dynamically join and leave.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-10-12
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23311002
Primary Topic
Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
Type
preprint
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preprint

Anolis: A Censorship-Resistant Anonymous Communication System with Zero-Knowledge Streaming Settlements and Asymmetric Rendezvous

Autotomy Severin
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
preprint

Anolis: A Censorship-Resistant Anonymous Communication System with Zero-Knowledge Streaming Settlements and Asymmetric Rendezvous

Autotomy Severin
preprint en

Abstract

Low-latency anonymous communication has long faced a set of structural contradictions: Tor-style networks rely on covertly distributed directories and unpaid volunteer nodes, making it hard to resist directory blocking and lacking sustainable node incentives; mix networks such as Nym and Lokinet, which maintain topology and incentives on public ledgers, mitigate global passive monitoring but expose gateways and relay endpoints to active censors' traversal blocking; and paying for transport service under the premise of anonymity means that the payment behavior itself may leave linkable traces between the communicating parties. This paper proposes Anolis, a peer-to-peer anonymous communication system driven by economic incentives and requiring no centralized services. The two communicating parties each build a multi-hop relay node chain and splice them into a bidirectional chained-proxy channel at a rendezvous point, with neither end knowing the other's network location or real identity; rendezvous signaling is anchored on blockchain consensus, exploiting the asynchrony of on-chain confirmation to decouple the two sides' connection-establishment timing and raise the cost of traffic-correlation attacks at the rendezvous phase; zero-knowledge streaming payment proofs hide payment contents and channel parameters while allowing either the payer or the relay to settle at any time, without trusted third-party arbitration; relay endpoints are not on-chain and can only be discovered through paid channels, raising the cost for attackers to enumerate nodes and launch traversal blocking; a pluggable transport layer mitigates deep-packet-inspection fingerprints. Paid service replaces the volunteer model: relays may provide service only after staking-based registration, and behavioral violations are absorbed by the guaranteed service fee and market reputation, so that relay supply sustains itself while nodes dynamically join and leave.

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
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Anolis: A Censorship-Resistant Anonymous Communication System with Zero-Knowledge Streaming Settlements and Asymmetric Rendezvous — Autotomy Severin · Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) (2026) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS