Jurisprudence of Heterogeneous Subjects: Legal Subjecthood, Responsibility, Sanctionability, and Procedural Standing

This paper examines legal subjecthood, rights attribution, responsibility, sanctionability, and procedural standing across heterogeneous subject configurations. It argues for a source-specific and historically situated analysis of juridical positions that distinguishes protected interests, the exercise of legal capacity, attribution of acts, duties and their breach, liability, penal constraints, and procedural access. Drawing on incident-based jurisprudence and a preliminary Generative Relational research programme, the analysis combines doctrinal comparison with accounts of representation, evidence, institutional power, cross-jurisdictional translation, and changes of legal status. Human, nonhuman animal, natural-entity, organizational, artificial-system, and hypothetical extraterrestrial cases illuminate both the portability and the limits of such distinctions. Existing human-rights protections and criminal-law safeguards retain their independent authority; proposals for artificial or extraterrestrial trial legal positions remain conditional. The paper develops source-indexed analytical records for legal recognition, rights, agency, conduct, responsibility, sanctioning, standing, translation, institutional power, and historical transitions, along with a cross-dossier compatibility rule and a worked comparison of natural-entity representation and automated credit scoring. A register of jurisprudential research obligations identifies conditions for withholding inference. Its conclusion consolidates three contributions: the non-equivalence and interdependence of legal incidents; the dependence of their practical exercise on law, evidence, representation, and institutions; and the need to preserve accountability and procedural safeguards when proposing new forms of legal recognition. The framework supplies a revisable method of inquiry, not a universal test of personhood or an authorization to extend penal jurisdiction. Its formal economy treats cross-case comparison as reuse of a common position record rather than as a separate predictive model, and tests attribution against counterexamples involving advisory scoring, institutional review, and legal-person sanctions. Subsequent work separately examines adjudicative authority, shared nomos, and aid-specific legal duties.