Losing the goal, finding the way: a dilemma for realist naturalistic metaphysics

Abstract Difficulties with the epistemology of metaphysics are often thought to be remedied by naturalizing the field. In this paper, two proposals for such a kind of metaphysics are examined. These proposals face a dilemma: one of them reduces metaphysics to a mere ontological catalog of scientific posits, while the other reverts to the speculative methods naturalism sought to avoid. It is argued that both fail to achieve their goals unless some modifications are made with regard to their commitments to scientific realism. § 1 introduces both kinds of naturalistic metaphysics and their relation with scientific realism; § 2 focuses on the first proposal and § 3 on the second; § 4 closes with the dilemma and a suggestion. In both sections § 2 and § 3, we emphasize how the shared goal of the mentioned approaches, which is commitment to scientific realism, encounters several problems with underdetermination in quantum foundations.