A Note on Aristotle’s Definition of Anger in the Rhetoric

This paper offers an analysis of Aristotle’s definition of anger in Book II of the Rhetoric. The text of the definition is contested, and recent editions have seemed to settle in favor of a textual emendation that is tied to a mistaken understanding of Aristotle’s intended meaning. In particular, this paper argues against Kassel’s emendation of the last clause of the definition (ὀλιγωρϵῖν μὴ προσηκόντων) and in favor of the more traditional reading (τοῦ ὀλιγωρϵῖν μὴ προσήκοντος). If Kassel’s emendation stands, anger is, according to Aristotle, always caused by the slights of inappropriate sorts of people. This fits poorly with Aristotle’s account of anger, and his examples show that it is the slighting, and not necessarily the slighter, that is inappropriate.