Wait for It: Why Authoritarians Reshuffle Ruling Coalitions After Elections

This article asks whether elections, even if they are not free and fair, might still have important consequences for authoritarian ruling coalitions, testing the theory that dictators avoid destabilizing their coalition before an election, but can afford to do this once the vote has passed. Disregarding the competitiveness and integrity of elections, the post-electoral period may serve as a face-saving time for resignations and as an opportunity for promotions or other cabinet changes, which autocrats can leverage to manage elites. Examining panel data on authoritarian regimes that held presidential elections in which the incumbent retained office between 1967 and 2023, I find that cabinet turnover is significantly higher in the period following elections. By exploiting the quasi-exogenous timing of scheduled elections and multiple robustness checks, the analysis shows that elections trigger elite reshuffling rather than merely coinciding with it.