Epistemic Blame: It’s Not You, It’s Me

Abstract Against epistemic blame skeptics, I argue that routine epistemic evaluation cannot account for epistemic judgments which come laced with feeling. Epistemic blame, like moral blame, is prevalent in our practices and worth conceptualizing. Jessica Brown’s account captures the phenomenon well: epistemic blame arises when we believe that someone has inexcusably veered away from truth, understanding, or knowledge, coupled with the desire that they had not done so. However, as I argue here, instances of epistemic blame can fail to pick out blameworthiness – they do not reliably tell us if the blame is fitting or appropriate, and this is what matters from the standpoint of rationality. Thus, Brown’s account cannot explain epistemic blame’s epistemic significance. I consider the possibility, turning to Cameron Boult’s account, that the significance of epistemic blame lies in regulating epistemic relationships by signaling when we ought to modify trust, but here, again, I find that epistemic blame is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition. Thus, even if we grant that epistemic blame is a distinct kind, its significance, from the standpoint of rationality, is unclear.