From Hard Power to Information Power: Can Disinformation Be Understood as a Form of Hybrid Warfare?

The exercise of power in geopolitical competition now extends beyond economic capability and conventional military force. This article argues that disinformation has become a strategic instrument of information power. It can be deployed to influence perceptions, manipulate political narratives, erode institutional trust and exploit social divisions without direct physical coercion. It asks whether the deliberate use of disinformation can be understood as a form of hybrid warfare, and answers that it can, but only under specific conditions. The article proposes a three-part test (state direction, synchronization with other instruments of power, and a strategic sub-threshold aim) and applies it to Russian operations in Ukraine and the Baltic states, to the 2016 United States election, and to Chinese operations directed at Taiwan. It argues that information power does not replace hard power but extends the ways in which power can be exercised, and that analyses of power and conflict must account not only for who holds military or economic capabilities, but also for who can shape the information environment in which societies interpret political events and make collective decisions.