JAMEEL'S ECONOMIC LAW OF RESPONSIBILITY BURDEN: A Coasean Extension from External Costs to Decentralized Reliability Responsibility

This paper sets out a framework, Jameel's Economic Law of Responsibility Burden, for understanding what happens when centrally and institutionally guaranteed infrastructure is replaced by decentralized or autonomous substitutes. It argues that operational and reliability responsibilities previously absorbed by institutions may be transferred to individual end-users and that, where the resulting operational, cognitive, and temporal inputs remain unpriced, conventional evaluation may overstate the efficiency gain. The framework is offered as a Coasean extension of an institutional-allocation perspective, moving from social costs toward reliability responsibility. Professor Dr.John Komlos's real-world economics framework is used as a welfare bridge, supporting the point that aggregate indicators such as GDP can rise while lived well-being does not improve. Dr.Stephen I. Ternyik's Reliability-Burden Transfer Principle is presented as compatible, sector-specific supporting evidence rather than a theoretical origin or proof. The paper applies the framework to residential energy, electric mobility, informal markets, healthcare, artificial intelligence, digital finance, and global supply chains, and states testable implications. Its central proposition is that when institutions transfer responsibility, the burden does not disappear; it changes location. Keywords (final, unchanged) Responsibility Burden; Institutional Economics; Coasean Extension; Decentralized Infrastructure; Unpriced Cognitive Labor; Professor Dr.John Komlos; Real-World Economics; System Reliability; AI Governance; Dr.Stephen I. Ternyik's