Electoral democracy, lottocracy, and social inequality

Abstract This article compares electoral democracy and lottocracy from the perspective of social egalitarianism. Social egalitarians hold that political institutions should be assessed by whether they enable persons to stand to one another as social equals, rather than as inferiors and superiors. I distinguish two dimensions of social inequality relevant to the justification of political procedures: asymmetries of inescapable and final power and unmerited disparities of consideration. I then argue, first, that electoral democracy is not obviously superior to lottocracy in addressing the vertical inequality of political power between officials and non-officials, because electoral accountability does not by itself secure egalitarian popular control and is vulnerable to inequalities of informal influence. Second, I argue that lottocracy has a prima facie advantage in addressing the biased composition of legislative officials, thereby addressing the social egalitarian concern about disparities of consideration. Unlike electoral democracy, sortition reduces the extent to which wealth, voter bias, and various demographic or socioeconomic characteristics shape individuals’ prospects of obtaining political office. The article thus identifies social egalitarian considerations that matter for the comparative evaluation of electoral democracy and lottocracy.