Pre-Conceptual Being and the Argument from Individuality: Schelling on Metaphysics VII

Abstract In his later period, Schelling argued that being remains opaque to conceptual analysis in important ways and that a purely intellectual engagement with being is therefore insufficient. This issue is central to Schelling’s overall project, as his demand for a “positive” philosophy – one that exceeds the merely rational – depends on an effective self-limitation of a priori metaphysics. According to a widely held interpretation, Schelling’s appeal to a pre-conceptual dimension of being is based on Leibniz’s question regarding the cause of anything at all. In contrast, I propose that it is Aristotle who provides Schelling with the decisive argument for pre-conceptual being, and that the problem at stake is not the existence of anything at all, but rather the individuality of particular beings. I develop this claim through an analysis of Schelling’s argument in light of Aristotle’s theory of substance in Metaphysics VII and conclude by assessing its validity and scope.