New Laws, Old Habits: Intelligence Reform Failure in Brazil

Third-wave democracies have adopted the standard toolkit of intelligence reform—new legal frameworks, meritocratic recruitment, and parliamentary oversight—yet domestic surveillance and political instrumentalization persist. We advance an underexplored variable to explain this gap: professionalization without credible deterrence, which transforms technical capacity into a low-cost resource for misconduct, regardless of personnel cohort. We examine the argument through the Brazilian case, combining documentary analysis of the parliamentary oversight committee (CCAI, 2007–2025) with process tracing of the Parallel ABIN scandal. Of the 53 civil servants implicated, 48 were recruited after re-democratization through competitive examinations—ruling out authoritarian-legacy explanations as sufficient, and showing how formally reformed institutions socialize new cohorts into anachronistic practices when accountability cannot impose costs. The findings carry implications for intelligence reform trajectories across third-wave democracies, particularly in Latin America and Eastern Europe.

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Publication Details

Journal
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence
Published
2026-10-07
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2026.2729919
Primary Topic
Intelligence, Security, War Strategy
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
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article

New Laws, Old Habits: Intelligence Reform Failure in Brazil

Eduardo Izycki, Luiz Silva
International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence
Intelligence, Security, War Strategy
article

New Laws, Old Habits: Intelligence Reform Failure in Brazil

Eduardo Izycki, Luiz Silva
article en

Abstract

Third-wave democracies have adopted the standard toolkit of intelligence reform—new legal frameworks, meritocratic recruitment, and parliamentary oversight—yet domestic surveillance and political instrumentalization persist. We advance an underexplored variable to explain this gap: professionalization without credible deterrence, which transforms technical capacity into a low-cost resource for misconduct, regardless of personnel cohort. We examine the argument through the Brazilian case, combining documentary analysis of the parliamentary oversight committee (CCAI, 2007–2025) with process tracing of the Parallel ABIN scandal. Of the 53 civil servants implicated, 48 were recruited after re-democratization through competitive examinations—ruling out authoritarian-legacy explanations as sufficient, and showing how formally reformed institutions socialize new cohorts into anachronistic practices when accountability cannot impose costs. The findings carry implications for intelligence reform trajectories across third-wave democracies, particularly in Latin America and Eastern Europe.

International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence
Universidade de Brasília (BR), Universidade Federal do ABC (BR)
Openalex Percentile: Top 3%
Intelligence, Security, War Strategy
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New Laws, Old Habits: Intelligence Reform Failure in Brazil — Eduardo Izycki, Luiz Silva · International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence (2026) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS