Information Field of the Subject: Definition and Boundaries

The note uncovers a hidden assumption frequently encountered in the works of the MBM series. The term "information field" is often used as if it designated something objective, independent of an observer. In reality, in most contexts, what is meant is the field accessible to a concrete subject S at their cognitive register L_k and level of description G. The author distinguishes two modes of use: ontological (the field as a projection of EFOS at G=informational, independent of the subject) and epistemic (the field as what is accessible to a concrete subject here and now). Mixing these modes creates an illusion of objectivity. Formally, the field for S is defined as P_(G=informational)(EFOS) ∩ accessible(S, L_k, G). Causes of accessibility are classified along two axes: internal/external and natural/artificial. A separate class of active distortion is particularly highlighted — the purposeful alteration of the subject's field by other subjects in their own interests. This class differs from passive limitations by four features: agency, directionality, asymmetry, recursiveness. It is structurally related to the concept of informational control introduced for the biological level (F2, parasitoid control) and carried over to the civilizational level (F3). Consequences for other terms of the series are discussed: infosphere, inforeality, informational control. Inforeality remains an ontological category, not subject-relative. The subject's field is not only a function of (S, L_k, G) — it also depends on the actions of other subjects. Open questions are formulated: metric of the volume of the accessible field, distinction of actual/potential/inaccessible, connection with ICP, dynamics of the field, free will, resistance to distortion, ethics of active distortion. The note does not solve the problem empirically, but only conceptually.