Bank Indonesia and the Evolution of Hybrid Constitutional Central Banking: A Comparative Perspective

The constitutional status of central banks raises a fundamental tension between monetary-policy independence and democratic accountability, particularly in emerging constitutional democracies undergoing institutional reform. This article examines how Indonesia’s constitutional and statutory framework structures the independence and accountability of Bank Indonesia and compares its institutional design with the European Central Bank, the Federal Reserve System, and the Bank of England. Using doctrinal legal research and a functional comparative constitutional approach, the analysis focuses on constitutional entrenchment, statutory delegation, and accountability mechanisms. It examines Article 23D of the 1945 Constitution, the Bank Indonesia Law, the financial-sector reforms introduced by Law No. 4 of 2023, and their latest recalibration under Law No. 4 of 2026. The findings show that Bank Indonesia combines constitutional recognition with statutorily structured operational autonomy, an expanded monetary and macroprudential mandate, inter-institutional financial-stability coordination, and increasingly structured parliamentary accountability. Unlike the treaty-entrenched European Central Bank and the predominantly statute-based Federal Reserve and Bank of England, Bank Indonesia occupies an intermediate constitutional position. The article conceptualises this arrangement as Hybrid Constitutional Central Banking, in which constitutional entrenchment, legislative adaptability, operational independence, and democratic accountability coexist. The post2026 framework further demonstrates that the central constitutional challenge is not whether Bank Indonesia remains formally independent, but how accountability and coordination can be strengthened without permitting political interference in monetary judgment.