Thinking with Objects. Understanding Non-Representational Cognitive Artifacts

This paper defends the notion of cognitive artifacts that do not serve representational functions. Contrary to the standard account of cognitive artifacts as representational, we argue that it is possible to distinguish a special class of artifacts that fulfill cognitive roles without performing representational functions. With reference to cognitive semiotics, we respond to Fasoli’s critique of ecological cognitive artifacts, which were defined as non-representational by Heersmink. First, cognitive semiotics identifies key features of the representational relation. This relation arises through interactions between the object and the user. It requires the user to appreciate the duality between expression and content. Second, cognitive semiotics distinguishes between reality and pictorial modes of experiencing artifacts. We apply this framework to explore what happens when an artifact is experienced in reality mode: situations in which its representational function is disregarded by the user, or in which the artifact has no representational function to begin with. Based on three examples from the literature (file structure visualization, hotel key weight, and intelligent use of space), we propose a class of cognitive artifacts that can be meaningful in a technical sense with respect to users’ cognitive goals and needs, even if the artifacts are not carriers of representations or their representational functions are not recognized as such.