Ground-Truth Physics Residuals for Detecting Stealthy False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grids

Stealthy false data injection (FDI) attacks exploit a fundamental weakness of conventional residualbased bad-data detection: a carefully structured measurement perturbation can remain statistically acceptable to the state-estimation residual while moving the reported measurements away from the electrical state represented by the actual network.This paper develops and empirically evaluates a ground-truth physics-residual methodology for identifying that discrepancy.The key idea is to compute electricalconsistency residuals directly from the defender-side network admittance matrix (Ybus), reconstructed voltage phasors, reported active/reactive power, and line-flow balance, and to use these residuals as an explicit feature stream in a spatial-temporal detector.The evaluation uses a corrected benchmark of 2,016 simulation runs spanning IEEE 39-bus and IEEE 118bus systems, 18 balanced scenario cells, and three attacker-knowledge tiers for stealthy FDI.The primary detector combines graph attention, temporal LSTM representation, and the physics-residual stream.On the held-out corrected test split, pooled precision, recall, F1 and ROC-AUC are 0.727, 0.715, 0.721 and 0.815, respectively, compared with F1/ROC-AUC of 0.596/0.569for a Chi-squared bad-data detector and 0.621/0.677for a vanilla LSTM.FDI-specific F1 is 0.910, 0.902 and 0.892 for attacker tiers 1-3.Removing the physics stream reduces F1 by 34.8, 38.2 and 36.0 percentage points for the three FDI tiers.A sequenceposition control achieves F1=0.0 and ROC-AUC=0.5 after correction of an earlier fixed-onset leakage defect.The results provide strong first-pass evidence that explicit electrical-consistency information materially improves stealthy-FDI detection, while also exposing an important topology-dependent false-positive problem: 0% on IEEE 39-bus versus 25.5% on IEEE 118-bus.The paper therefore presents the residual methodology as a reproducible research mechanism rather than as evidence of deployment readiness.

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Publication Details

Journal
International Journal of Innovative Research in Technology
Published
2026-10-05
DOI
https://doi.org/10.64643/ijirtv13i5-209166-459
Primary Topic
Smart Grid Security and Resilience
Type
article
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article

Ground-Truth Physics Residuals for Detecting Stealthy False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grids

Pawan Kumar Pareek, Surya Prakash Chaturvedula
International Journal of Innovative Research in Technology
Smart Grid Security and Resilience
article

Ground-Truth Physics Residuals for Detecting Stealthy False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grids

Pawan Kumar Pareek, Surya Prakash Chaturvedula
article en

Abstract

Stealthy false data injection (FDI) attacks exploit a fundamental weakness of conventional residualbased bad-data detection: a carefully structured measurement perturbation can remain statistically acceptable to the state-estimation residual while moving the reported measurements away from the electrical state represented by the actual network.This paper develops and empirically evaluates a ground-truth physics-residual methodology for identifying that discrepancy.The key idea is to compute electricalconsistency residuals directly from the defender-side network admittance matrix (Ybus), reconstructed voltage phasors, reported active/reactive power, and line-flow balance, and to use these residuals as an explicit feature stream in a spatial-temporal detector.The evaluation uses a corrected benchmark of 2,016 simulation runs spanning IEEE 39-bus and IEEE 118bus systems, 18 balanced scenario cells, and three attacker-knowledge tiers for stealthy FDI.The primary detector combines graph attention, temporal LSTM representation, and the physics-residual stream.On the held-out corrected test split, pooled precision, recall, F1 and ROC-AUC are 0.727, 0.715, 0.721 and 0.815, respectively, compared with F1/ROC-AUC of 0.596/0.569for a Chi-squared bad-data detector and 0.621/0.677for a vanilla LSTM.FDI-specific F1 is 0.910, 0.902 and 0.892 for attacker tiers 1-3.Removing the physics stream reduces F1 by 34.8, 38.2 and 36.0 percentage points for the three FDI tiers.A sequenceposition control achieves F1=0.0 and ROC-AUC=0.5 after correction of an earlier fixed-onset leakage defect.The results provide strong first-pass evidence that explicit electrical-consistency information materially improves stealthy-FDI detection, while also exposing an important topology-dependent false-positive problem: 0% on IEEE 39-bus versus 25.5% on IEEE 118-bus.The paper therefore presents the residual methodology as a reproducible research mechanism rather than as evidence of deployment readiness.

International Journal of Innovative Research in TechnologyVol. 13(5)
NIIT University (IN), Jaipur National University (IN)
Openalex Percentile: Top 16%
Smart Grid Security and Resilience
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