Being and Being This: Haecceity and the Univocal Concept of Being in Duns Scotus

Abstract Haecceity is often understood as a theoretical construct posited by Duns Scotus to explain individuation. This characterization is flawed in two ways: first, it lends haecceity an ad hoc appearance and obscures the fact that it is called for by Scotus’s most basic philosophical commitments; second, it undermines what little description Scotus gives us of haecceities since, in his treatments of individuation, he appeals to logical features of a haecceity’s concept to draw conclusions about its metaphysical properties in a move that is not clearly justified. I argue that haecceity is entailed by Scotus’s doctrine of the univocity of the concept of being well before he presents it as a solution to the problem of individuation. Understanding haecceity through its relationship to the concept of being situates it as a coherent member of Scotus’s ontology and better explains why he attributes to it the properties that he does.