Proximity Vitalism: a Structural Account of Experience

Critical, unstated assumptions lurk behind many persistent puzzles in the Theories of Mind (TOM). Only three commitments (3C) are required to expose them: 1) private, subjective experience exists (EE), 2) public, objective observables anchor experience (PE), and 3) differences in E imply differences in their anchoring P-constellations (PP). EE and PE are widely, though not universally, accepted. But even where EE and PE are accepted, their full consequences are rarely considered together. PP's directional claim on P and E is intuitively familiar. But even where PP is structurally necessary, it is almost never made explicit. Without PP, there is no foundation for empirical research on the mind. Yet EE and PE foreclose the external confirmation of any such research. Proximity Vitalism can be summarized in a single sentence: the public world tracks private experience — but you will never be able to prove it. This paper will examine four families in the TOM (4T): Dualism, Physicalism, Idealism and Panpsychism. Each of the 4T will be shown to contain a sub-theory that rejects at least one of the 3C. Each of the 4T will be shown to contain a sub-theory that accepts all three commitments.