Land Tenure Insecurity, Agricultural Credit Demand, and CGSL Participation in South Sudan: A Political Economy Analysis

This article examines the political economy relationship between land tenure insecurity, agricultural credit demand and participation in Community Group Saving and Lending (CGSL) mechanisms in rural South Sudan. It converts a doctoral mixed-methods study on CGSL mechanisms in Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei and Lakes States into a focused journal article on land-credit dynamics. The argument is that land insecurity and weak rural financial infrastructure interact to produce a collateral gap: farmers need credit to invest in land, improved seed, tools, storage and modern technology, yet formal lenders hesitate because rights, repayment capacity, infrastructure and enforcement remain uncertain. CGSLs emerge in this gap as member-managed institutions that use social collateral, repeated meetings, savings discipline and community knowledge to provide small loans where land titles and bank collateral are weak. The study drew on 81 valid survey responses from an accessible sample of 85 and 17 qualitative interviews. The evidence shows strong demand for rural finance: access to rural financial services improving productivity recorded an overall mean score of 4.58, productivity rising through investment recorded 4.49, modern agricultural technology being capital intensive recorded 4.30 and scarcity of working capital recorded 4.68. The more land-sensitive item, allocation of land for high-yielding varieties, recorded a mean of 3.90, while long-term investment in land, machinery and infrastructure recorded a lower mean of 3.51. Chi-square tests showed significant associations between CGSL participation and agricultural outcome indicators (chi-square = 15.92, p = 0.0001), and logistic regression showed that access to credit significantly influenced decisions to invest in modern agricultural technologies (beta = 1.9459, p = 0.026). The article argues that tenure insecurity should not be treated only as a legal problem; it is a rural finance problem, a risk-allocation problem and a political economy problem. Policy remedies should therefore combine low-cost recognition of local rights, protection of women and youth use rights, CGSL record standardisation, gradual linkage to MFIs and SACCOs, and patient credit for land-improving investments.