Mate Market Returns to Male Resources and Sex-Biased Parental Transfers

The present paper sets forth a straightforward, frequency-dependent theory for the existence of a male-biased transfer from parents to children. Specifically, the theory is based on the observation that when male endowments increase males' mating success, it may become optimal for parents to allocate more resources to their sons. As total matches are restricted by the number of individuals participating in the monogamous matching process, the theory assumes that male matchmaking ability is fixed in relation to the behavior of individuals in the population, as opposed to simply assuming that increased resources generate additional marriages. There are two succinct propositions which illustrate the workings of the mechanism. In the first case of one-sided allocation, the optimal parental resource allocation exhibits a small male bias as the return from male resources increases. In the second case when there exist two strategies in the population, the bias towards more allocations to sons decreases as the frequency of the strategy increases, and an interior equilibrium may exist. Numerical examples and deterministic simulations are used to show how the model's predictions vary depending on the frequency. The paper presents a theoretical mechanism without testing any hypothesis on fertility, genetic selection, or origin of son preference in society.