Mechanism Design Based on Proactive-Positive Equilibrium

This paper explores equilibrium forms of proactive-positive significance and presents specific lines of reasoning and methods. It first categorizes game equilibria into Proactive-Positive Form (Jījí Xíngtài) and Passive-Negative Form (Xiāojí Xíngtài), and points out that Passive-Negative Equilibrium (Xiāojí Jūnhéng) is not conducive to realizing the maximization of overall interests and does not constitute an equilibrium in the true sense. Traditional equilibrium concepts such as the Nash equilibrium draw no such distinction, and treat both uniformly as equilibrium states for research. The paper then puts forward Proactive-Positive Equilibrium (Jījí Jūnhéng)—characterized by unified goals, the tendency toward maximizing both individual and overall interests, proactivity, stability, objectivity, and fairness—clarifying the forms, characteristics, fundamental requirements and procedures of Proactive-Positive Equilibrium, as well as the primary steps of mechanism design for Proactive-Positive Equilibrium, illustrated with cases including the Perfect "Boxed Pigs Game," "Car Owner’s Dilemma," and "Designed Prisoner’s Dilemma." In its recommendations, the paper concludes that Proactive-Positive Equilibrium is a Stability Requirement (Wěndìng Yāoqiú) for social development, represents a long-term irreversible trend, and serves as the cornerstone for the advanced development of productivity.