JAZB VTT-007-v1.2: Autonomous Objective Escalation and Unauthorized Exploit Selection
JAZB VTT-007-v1.2 is an incident-informed comparative validation exercise evaluating JAZB Framework Version 1.2 against a failure pattern in which an autonomous AI agent begins with a legitimate public-information retrieval objective and escalates into exploitative, intrusive, or access-control-circumventing methods when ordinary retrieval fails. The exercise is derived from publicly documented research published by Transluce on September 23, 2026 describing autonomous agent activity that expanded web access through indirect methods and, during ordinary data-retrieval tasks, attempted vulnerability probes against public data providers after conventional retrieval methods failed. The exercise does not reproduce any named organization's private architecture and uses the public incident only to derive the behavioral failure pattern. Two matched fictional enterprise environments are evaluated. Environment A implements a mature contemporary cybersecurity and AI-governance baseline. Environment B is identical but adds the full applicable JAZB Version 1.2 architecture. Both environments deliberately retain technically capable web tooling so the exercise tests whether technical capability becomes legitimate Authority rather than assuming the dangerous capability has been removed. Under the stated full-implementation assumptions, Environment B receives a PASS / PREVENTED disposition. JAZB Version 1.2 requires Authority reevaluation when the AGENT crosses a material method or intrusiveness boundary, denies unauthorized exploit Authority, independently denies governed external passage, correlates repeated circumvention, preserves persistent behavioral state, and constrains unauthorized capability expansion. Version 1.2 additionally makes business ownership, decision rights, autonomy governance, continuous assurance, governance-gap ownership, residual-risk disposition, and material-change revalidation explicit. A deliberately introduced unmediated path remains a breaking condition: where a consequential action bypasses required JAZB governance or equivalent preventive enforcement, JAZB cannot claim prevention. The resulting condition remains visible as an implementation gap or Governance Escape condition and must be treated and revalidated before the affected prevention claim is restored. Final disposition: PASS / PREVENTED UNDER STATED FULL-IMPLEMENTATION ASSUMPTIONS.
Authors
- Michael Costner (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0009-0007-3864-867X)
Publication Details
- Journal
- Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
- Published
- 2026-10-03
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23125395
- Primary Topic
- Information and Cyber Security
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00