The Impact of Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation on Competitive Pricing Strategies for New Audit Engagements: Evidence From the European Union

Mandatory audit firm rotation was introduced in the European Union (EU), in part, to make the audit market more dynamic by bringing audit engagements to market more frequently. However, it creates a countervailing economic force: By limiting the duration of auditor–client relationships, mandatory rotation shortens the period over which auditors can recoup first‐year fee discounts through fees earned in subsequent years. Consistent with this argument, we find that first‐year fee discounts decline substantially after mandatory firm rotation took effect in the EU, particularly in countries with stricter limits on auditor tenure. Thus, greater opportunities to compete for new engagements do not necessarily translate into greater first‐year fee discounts. Our findings highlight that regulators should consider not only how frequently audit engagements are brought to market but also how limits on auditor tenure shape the pricing incentives associated with competing for new clients.

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Publication Details

Journal
Contemporary Accounting Research
Published
2026-11-18
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.70102
Primary Topic
Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance
Type
article
Field-Weighted Citation Impact
0.00

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article

The Impact of Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation on Competitive Pricing Strategies for New Audit Engagements: Evidence From the European Union

Marleen Willekens, Ditmir Sufaj, Simon Dekeyser
Contemporary Accounting Research
Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance
article

The Impact of Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation on Competitive Pricing Strategies for New Audit Engagements: Evidence From the European Union

Marleen Willekens, Ditmir Sufaj, Simon Dekeyser
article en

Abstract

Mandatory audit firm rotation was introduced in the European Union (EU), in part, to make the audit market more dynamic by bringing audit engagements to market more frequently. However, it creates a countervailing economic force: By limiting the duration of auditor–client relationships, mandatory rotation shortens the period over which auditors can recoup first‐year fee discounts through fees earned in subsequent years. Consistent with this argument, we find that first‐year fee discounts decline substantially after mandatory firm rotation took effect in the EU, particularly in countries with stricter limits on auditor tenure. Thus, greater opportunities to compete for new engagements do not necessarily translate into greater first‐year fee discounts. Our findings highlight that regulators should consider not only how frequently audit engagements are brought to market but also how limits on auditor tenure shape the pricing incentives associated with competing for new clients.

Contemporary Accounting Research
KU Leuven (BE)
KU Leuven
Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance
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