Corruption and Public-Private Partnerships in Infrastructure: A Conceptual and Empirical Analysis

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have emerged as a dominant modality for infrastructure delivery worldwide, yet they remain acutely vulnerable to corruption at every stage of the project cycle. This paper synthesises conceptual and empirical insights to examine the nature, forms, and drivers of corruption in PPP infrastructure projects, and to identify anti-corruption measures that can strengthen governance. Drawing on a framework distinguishing the vertical and horizontal components of corruption rent, alongside established theories of principal–agent dynamics and transaction cost economics, the paper argues that corruption in PPPs is not a peripheral concern but an endogenous feature of complex, long-term contractual arrangements characterised by information asymmetries, discretionary decision-making, and blurred public–private boundaries. The paper identifies four critical stages—project selection, design and approval, contractor selection and award, and execution and management—where corruption risks concentrate. Through case evidence from Kenya, Albania, the Philippines, Turkey, and Lebanon, the analysis demonstrates how political influence, cartel formation, and rent-seeking behaviour systematically undermine the public-interest objectives of PPPs. The paper concludes that effective anti-corruption strategies must combine institutional strengthening, transparency mechanisms, competitive procurement, and robust accountability systems, and must be embedded throughout the PPP lifecycle rather than treated as a post-award compliance exercise.