Living and surviving

The essay distinguishes between the quantity of life and the form of life, showing how survival can be both an end in itself and a means to the pursuit of other ends. It then examines the deferral of living to the future, the relationship between choice and risk, and the passage from personal prudence to paternalism. The thesis is that a longer duration of life does not by itself determine the value of the life preserved, and that, in cases of voluntary risk that is predominantly self-regarding and does not impose significant non-consensual harm on others, a greater quantity of life does not by itself constitute sufficient justification for limiting the form of life the individual has chosen. The essay finally examines the case in which protection no longer answers to the good of the protected person, but to the need of the decision-maker to avoid having to bear responsibility. The central problem, then, is not merely how long to live, but who is to decide how much of the form of one's own life may be sacrificed to its preservation. Keywords: survival; form of life; quantity of life; autonomy; paternalism; risk; hedonic adaptation; responsibility asymmetry; Vaneigem.