Religion and Public Support for Nuclear Weapons in Iran

Scholars often discuss religious norms as potential influences on political behavior and attitudes, particularly in systems where governance is institutionally embedded in religion. Yet the extent to which religious doctrines constrain attitudes toward weapons of mass destruction at the societal level remains insufficiently understood. The case of Iran has attracted particular attention: a fatwa by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei declares nuclear weapons haram (religiously forbidden) and has featured prominently in Iran’s official nuclear narrative. However, relatively little is known regarding how such religious prohibitions are interpreted by the general public, especially within the religious demographic that forms a critical pillar of the state’s institutional and ideological base. This article presents original survey data from Iran, including both closed- and open-ended responses, to assess how religiosity shapes support for nuclear weapons. It outlines two competing logics: one in which religion fosters principled moral restraint, and another in which religious identity may bolster strategic arguments for deterrence and self-defense. The findings show that more religious individuals are significantly more likely to support nuclear weapons, and tend to justify this support in strategic rather than theological terms. These results highlight a disconnect between elite religious rhetoric and the attitudes of the religious base, which appears more receptive to nuclear deterrence than official narratives suggest. This cleavage raises critical questions regarding potential policy shifts under future generational or leadership changes.