A Novel SRAM-based Cross-Coupled BRAM PUF Featuring Entropy-Driven Addressing for AMD FPGAs
SRAM-based Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are critical for securing FPGA-based embedded systems. However, traditional implementations face significant limitations: they typically require power cycling to extract entropy or rely on external complex circuitry to drive address sequences, potentially creating a larger attack surface for adversaries. This paper proposes a novel, fully standalone PUF architecture on AMD FPGAs that uses the timing violations of read and write operations. Unlike prior collision-based designs that depend on externally supplied random addresses, our proposed architecture introduces a mutual feedback loop where the metastable response of one Block RAM dynamically determines the address of its cross-coupled counterpart. This mechanism creates a self-sustaining entropy source that functions without depending on an external driver or power cycling. The design was implemented and validated on eight AMD Artix-7 FPGAs using a custom MicroBlaze-based data acquisition system. Experimental results demonstrate that the CC-RIWC PUF achieves an average uniqueness of 41.45% and reliability up to 98.37% across a wide temperature range ( \(-18^{\circ}C\) to \(50^{\circ}C\) ). While the self-driving cross-coupled architecture introduces a trade-off in resource usage (44 slices) and throughput (900 Mbps) compared to externally-driven primitives, it provides a superior architectural advantage by delivering a complete, standalone entropy primitive suitable for resource-constrained, always-on embedded systems like Internet-of-Things.
Authors
- İhsan Çiçek (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7881-1263)
- Ahmad Al Khas (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1005-5868)
- Salih Bayar (ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4600-1880)
Institutions
- Gebze Technical University (TR)
- Marmara University (TR)
Publication Details
- Journal
- ACM Transactions on Reconfigurable Technology and Systems
- Published
- 2026-09-28
- DOI
- https://doi.org/10.1145/3848637
- Primary Topic
- Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and Hardware Security
- Type
- article
- Field-Weighted Citation Impact
- 0.00