SECURITIZING SABOTAGE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION'S SECURITY STRATEGY: INSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION FROM COUNTER-TERRORISM TO HYBRID THREATS

This study analyzes how sabotage is defined, positioned, and addressed within the European Union’s (EU) security strategies through the lens of securitization theory. Unlike classical terrorism, sabotage is framed as an existential security threat, particularly targeting critical infrastructure, digital systems, and hybrid threats. Distinct from cyber-terrorism, which is ideologically driven, sabotage focuses on systematic infrastructure disruption, necessitating a multi-layered security regime involving institutions such as Europol, ENISA, and the Hybrid Fusion Cell. The study examines key EU documents, including the 2005 Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP), and ENISA reports, alongside case studies such as the 2022 Nord Stream pipeline sabotage, attacks on France’s energy infrastructure, and cyber-sabotage campaigns during the Russia-Ukraine war. Findings indicate that while the EU has developed an advanced institutional framework to counter sabotage, challenges persist due to national sovereignty issues, limited intelligence sharing, and gaps in democratic oversight. Recommendations include enhanced intelligence coordination, AI-based early warning systems, mandatory private sector compliance, and reforms focused on human rights.