Between Global Norms and Local Realities: The Institutional Dynamics of Anti-Corruption Agencies in the Global South

The global diffusion of anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) has become a central feature of governance reform across the Global South, yet agencies established under similar international “best practice” models display strikingly different levels of effectiveness. This article explains this variation by arguing that anti-corruption outcomes are shaped not by formal institutional design alone but by the interaction between institutional autonomy, domestic legitimacy, donor dependence, enforcement capacity, and political context. Drawing on a configurational comparative analysis of 16 Global South countries, the study shows a novel typology of institutional outcomes and identifies four recurring trajectories of anti-corruption governance: symbolic compliance, political co-optation, resilient adaptation, and donor-driven dependency. The article further reconceptualizes institutional autonomy as a relational and context-dependent outcome emerging from institutional embeddedness rather than a fixed legal attribute. By integrating insights from institutional theory, norm diffusion, and postcolonial governance, the article advances a context-sensitive framework for explaining why similar institutional models generate divergent outcomes and demonstrates that locally embedded legitimacy, rather than institutional replication, constitutes the foundation of sustainable anti-corruption governance.