The Hare and the Tortoise: Appraising the Different Designation Procedures in EU and UK Digital Regulation

This article critically appraises the designation procedures employed by two pioneering ex ante regulatory frameworks governing digital markets: the EU's Digital Markets Act (‘DMA’) and the UK's Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act (‘DMCCA’). It examines how these two legal frameworks adopt fundamentally divergent approaches to designation, reflecting distinct regulatory philosophies regarding speed, analytical rigour and error tolerance. The DMA operates as the regulatory ‘hare’, employing quantitative thresholds under Article 3(2) to enable rapid designation of gatekeepers operating core platform services. Within 45 working days, the European Commission can designate platforms meeting specified criteria regarding users, turnover and market capitalization. This threshold-based approach, complemented by qualitative market investigations under Article 3(8), has enabled designation of seven gatekeepers operating 23 core platform services. The DMA prioritizes preventing false negatives through predetermined, uniformly applicable obligations, accepting reduced analytical depth for expedience and comprehensive coverage. Conversely, the DMCCA embodies the ‘tortoise’ approach, mandating nine-month investigations requiring forward-looking analysis spanning at least five years. The Competition and Markets Authority (‘CMA’) must demonstrate both substantial and entrenched market power and position of strategic significance through evidence gathering, stakeholder consultations and economic analysis. By 9 June 2026, the CMA designated only two undertakings across three digital activities, reflecting prioritization of analytical depth and bespoke conduct requirements over speed and coverage. The comparative analysis examines four critical dimensions: timelines, analytical depth, platform coverage and resource intensiveness. The findings reveal that neither approach proves categorically superior. The DMA delivers immediate intervention across multiple markets but is characterized by limited adaptability. The DMCCA's thoroughness enables precisely tailored interventions but faces significant scalability constraints. This analysis contributes to ongoing debates regarding optimal regulatory design for dynamic digital markets, demonstrating how procedural architecture fundamentally shapes substantive regulatory outcomes.