From Conduit to Compliance Node: The Institutional Evolution of Supply Chain Intermediary Liability in China’s Anti-Counterfeiting Regime, 1979–2026

Background: Counterfeit goods realize illicit value only when moved, mainly by logistics intermediaries rather than counterfeiters, so how the law treats these intermediaries determines where enforcement can bite. This review traces the policies, laws, literature, and data relevant to China’s anti-counterfeiting landscape from 1979 to 2026. Methods: A narrative review combined a PRISMA 2020-guided search of Scopus and Web of Science (108 peer-reviewed publications) with 14 primary legal instruments and 4 types of institutional grey literature. Institutional theory was used to derive four expectations. Results: Four regulatory phases were identified, across which duties migrated toward logistics chokepoints: criminal accomplice liability (2004), civil facilitation liability, customs detention, platform liability, parcel-level identity, inspection and screening duties, franchisor network supervision (2024), and independent liability for assisting confusion (2025). Expectations of external origin, chokepoint migration, and ceremonial compliance were supported; capacity-calibrated decoupling awaits verification. Obligations were synthesized into an actor-by-actor matrix. Official data show that only about 3% of administrative cases reach criminal referral, with no breakdown by intermediary type. Conclusions: China has converted logistics intermediaries from neutral conduits into liability-bearing compliance nodes under a know-your-consignor regime calibrated to large integrated operators, but this regime still relies primarily on coercive measures.