Low carbon transition strategy of power system based on evolutionary game theory

Abstract Driven by the target of carbon peaking and carbon neutrality, the low-carbon transition of the power system is steadily advancing. However, the current level of refinement in modeling the revenue functions of multiple entities such as power generation companies, electricity consumers, and governments is insufficient, resulting in unclear dynamic evolution paths and policy designs. Therefore, this study comprehensively considers multiple key factors, including the assessment of deviations in new energy generation, the proportion of green electricity consumption, energy trading, carbon trading, and government subsidy regulation. On this basis, it innovatively constructs a dynamic evolutionary game model of enterprise–consumer–government. Through dynamic parameter calibration and numerical simulation analysis, it is found that: firstly, the willingness of power generation enterprises to develop new energy is mainly determined by their initial willingness and industry trends, and is less affected by government intervention. Secondly, the willingness of power consumers to update their equipment mainly relies on their own green awareness, and is limited by policies and other factors. Thirdly, the willingness of government intervention is significantly influenced by the willingness of electricity consumers, and an increase in consumer willingness can accelerate government withdrawal and promote market autonomy. Therefore, strategies such as energy-saving subsidies, differentiated regulation, and optimization of green power policies are proposed.