The Execution-Certainty Wedge: How Measurement Choices Rank Housing-Access Instruments

When sellers prefer offers that are more likely to close, cash buyers can win homes that financed buyers value more. This paper uses an agent-based housing market to compare four instruments that change who wins: a per-entity acquisition cap, a fair-share quota, a constant charge on institutional offers and a duty that rises with local contention. The ranking of these instruments depends on how access and efficiency are measured. An efficiency benchmark computed over the buyers still waiting moves with the policy, and for offer discounts between about 5% and 12% it reverses the sign of the duty's effect. Access measured over the whole run understates each instrument's effect on a cohort followed to purchase or exit, by factors of about 1.4 to 2.5, and ranks the instruments differently. Tuned to the same full-run access gain, a constant charge preserves more value than the contention duty; tuned to the same cohort gain, the duty keeps slightly more value at the ten-point target. At low institutional participation a fair-share quota that resets each period cannot reach small access targets, and letting its allowances carry forward removes that limit. New York City evidence does not support the model's premise as a description of that market, because much of the observed cash discount reflects who pays cash. The results are conditional comparisons in a stylised model, not a calibrated policy evaluation. Version 6.0 is a shorter version of the paper, about 7,700 words, organised around how measurement choices rank the instruments. It changes no result. It adds a two-period example showing why a benchmark computed over the waiting buyers moves with the policy, and bootstrap intervals for the break-even offer discounts: 11.7% (95% interval 11.5–11.8) at the baseline and 15.9% (15.6–16.1) at the lowest institutional share. The extended version, with the full robustness exercises, the discussion of implementation and legal form, and the complete replication record, remains available as version 5.1 (doi:10.5281/zenodo.22977667) and is included in the replication archive. Files: the manuscript PDF; WEDGE_v6_0.zip, the replication package, which regenerates every result in both versions; and revision_notes.md. For details of changes between versions, see revision_notes.md.

Authors

Publication Details

Journal
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Published
2026-09-26
DOI
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22980436
Primary Topic
Housing Market and Economics
Type
preprint
Controls
|||
ALL TIME
JAN
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
AUG
SEP
preprint

The Execution-Certainty Wedge: How Measurement Choices Rank Housing-Access Instruments

Pablo Loschi
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Housing Market and Economics
preprint

The Execution-Certainty Wedge: How Measurement Choices Rank Housing-Access Instruments

Pablo Loschi
preprint en

Abstract

When sellers prefer offers that are more likely to close, cash buyers can win homes that financed buyers value more. This paper uses an agent-based housing market to compare four instruments that change who wins: a per-entity acquisition cap, a fair-share quota, a constant charge on institutional offers and a duty that rises with local contention. The ranking of these instruments depends on how access and efficiency are measured. An efficiency benchmark computed over the buyers still waiting moves with the policy, and for offer discounts between about 5% and 12% it reverses the sign of the duty's effect. Access measured over the whole run understates each instrument's effect on a cohort followed to purchase or exit, by factors of about 1.4 to 2.5, and ranks the instruments differently. Tuned to the same full-run access gain, a constant charge preserves more value than the contention duty; tuned to the same cohort gain, the duty keeps slightly more value at the ten-point target. At low institutional participation a fair-share quota that resets each period cannot reach small access targets, and letting its allowances carry forward removes that limit. New York City evidence does not support the model's premise as a description of that market, because much of the observed cash discount reflects who pays cash. The results are conditional comparisons in a stylised model, not a calibrated policy evaluation. Version 6.0 is a shorter version of the paper, about 7,700 words, organised around how measurement choices rank the instruments. It changes no result. It adds a two-period example showing why a benchmark computed over the waiting buyers moves with the policy, and bootstrap intervals for the break-even offer discounts: 11.7% (95% interval 11.5–11.8) at the baseline and 15.9% (15.6–16.1) at the lowest institutional share. The extended version, with the full robustness exercises, the discussion of implementation and legal form, and the complete replication record, remains available as version 5.1 (doi:10.5281/zenodo.22977667) and is included in the replication archive. Files: the manuscript PDF; WEDGE_v6_0.zip, the replication package, which regenerates every result in both versions; and revision_notes.md. For details of changes between versions, see revision_notes.md.

Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research)
Sustainable cities and communities
Housing Market and Economics
AI Navigator

Ask Laika to Summarize, Analyze, and Connect papers live on the map.

Summarize Papers & Methodologies

Extract key findings, datasets, and comparative methods across publications.

Benchmark Rankings & Visual Analytics

Rank top research institutions, authors, funders, topics, and journals by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI) and paper volume with instant charts.

Connect Distant Disciplines

Bridge topological clusters on the map to find hidden collaborative intersections.

The Execution-Certainty Wedge: How Measurement Choices Rank Housing-Access Instruments — Pablo Loschi · Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) (2026) | TGRS Research Map | TGRS