Bureaucracy and anti-corruption in Greece: An analysis of policy failures and the blame game

Abstract This article analyzes anti-corruption policy and political dynamics in Greece without treating corruption as an objective condition or perception indices as neutral measures of wrongdoing. It focuses on the extensive legislative reforms and oversight bodies established over the past three decades and their limited impact on international rankings and public trust. The study examines how macro-economic conditions shape expert-driven perception indices, how rival parties instrumentalize corruption scandals in political competition, and how these processes affect institutional trust. It finds that Greece’s post-2012 improvement in corruption rankings was driven mainly by market liberalization under external conditionality rather than by effective governance reforms. At the same time, trust in political institutions did not increase, while a costly and bureaucratic anti-corruption apparatus expanded with limited results. The article argues that a persistent partisan ›blame game‹ marked by the strategic use of corruption allegations, generates recurrent scandals and superficial reforms that ultimately erode public trust and weaken democratic institutions.