Newman the Evidentialist

Abstract A number of recent philosophers have argued that John Henry Newman is an anti-evidentialist – and not without reason. This article begins by examining three reasons one might think Newman is an anti-evidentialist: his dismissal of formal logic, his emphasis on emotions, and his critique of John Locke. It then seeks to rebut these reasons for thinking that Newman is an anti-evidentialist as well as to give three positive reasons for thinking that Newman is an evidentialist. Newman’s evidentialism, it is argued, is seen in his account of conscience, his account of certitude, and his apologetic for Christianity in chapter 10 of A Grammar of Assent . These are not minor features of Newman’s epistemology that are easily detachable from his larger perspective. His accounts of conscience and certitude in particular are not only two of the most well-known passages in Newman’s corpus, but they express his deeply held and long-considered views. Thus, this article concludes that Newman is an evidentialist.