Measuring the efficiency of anti-corruption asset recovery: civil forfeiture vs criminalization of illicit enrichment in transitional economies (case of Ukraine)

Purpose This study aims to examine how two key anti-corruption instruments – criminal liability for illicit enrichment and the civil forfeiture of unjustified assets – operate in a transitional economy, tracing the trends in their application in Ukraine. Design/methodology/approach This study combines qualitative doctrinal analysis of legislation and quantitative empirical evaluation. The empirical base is an original data set of High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC) caseload statistics for 2019–2025, complemented by comparative analysis of international models. The empirical component is descriptive, mapping the volume and outcomes of proceedings rather than testing causal hypotheses. Findings Civil forfeiture has evolved into systemic mass application: lawsuits rose from 2 in 2021 to 44 in 2025, and recovered funds exceeded UAH 73m. Of 35 claims adjudicated in 2021–2025, 30 were granted – 85.7% of those decided and 44.1% of the 68 filed. Criminal prosecution for illicit enrichment produced far fewer completed outcomes: two convictions over seven years, both through plea bargains. Key obstacles to criminal proceedings are identified: an excessively high standard of proof, risks of asset alienation before verdict and the discretionary nature of special confiscation. Originality/value Juxtaposing domestic practice with that of European Union countries, the USA and Australia, the paper argues – as a policy proposition grounded in the caseload record rather than a demonstrated efficiency result – for reconsidering the mixed approach and concentrating enforcement on civil forfeiture. This option remains open to States Parties, since Article 20 of the UN Convention against Corruption requires only that criminalization be considered.