Mode as Differentiating Principle of Virtue: The Example of Humility and Magnanimity

Abstract: Thomas Aquinas distinguishes the cardinal virtues not only by their subjects—the powers of the soul that each virtue perfects—but also by the modi of moral virtue. The modi are more operative as a principle of division in the Secunda secundae. I show both that the modes are quasi-formal principles of moral virtue as such, and yet that the moral virtues are distinguished according to the predominance of one of these four modes over the others. I focus on the modes of curbing (refrenatio or moderatio) and strengthening (firmitas) particularly, arguing that the former consists in a rational measure in the sense appetite whereas the latter consists in the very stability or steadfastness of the sense appetite already measured by curbing. I end by considering Aquinas's division of humility and magnanimity in light of his account of the modes, arguing that humility exhibits the predominant mode of curbing in restraining the passion of hope, whereas magnanimity exhibits the predominant mode of strengthening in rendering the sense appetite steadfast against despair.