Incentive and Restraint Mechanisms for Collaborative Innovation of Green Intelligent Building Technologies Toward Low-Carbon and Digital Transformation in the Construction 5.0

Against the dual backdrop of the “dual carbon” goals and the digital transformation of the construction enterprises (CEs), green intelligent building technologies (GIBTs) have become the core driving force for improving quality and efficiency in the CEs and achieving low-carbon, sustainable development. Taking the collaborative innovation and development of GIBTs as the research context, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model involving three players (TPs), the government, CEs, and academic and research institutions (ARIs), to systematically analyze the evolution-stable strategies of the collaborative innovation system for GIBTs and their underlying mechanisms. The research findings indicate: (1) Government subsidy funds for collaborative innovation directed at both CEs and ARIs have distinct critical thresholds; the subsidy amount directly determines whether the system can converge to the ideal equilibrium of comprehensive three-player collaboration (participation, collaboration, collaboration). (2) The incentive effects of green incentives on the two types of innovation entities, CEs and ARIs, exhibit significant heterogeneity. Green incentives for CEs are highly sensitive core control parameters, while those for ARIs are weakly sensitive auxiliary parameters. (3) The cost-sharing ratios for research and development (R&D) between CEs and ARIs affect, respectively, the equilibrium level of the TPs collaboration and the stability of the system’s dynamic convergence. Relying solely on internal cost-sharing mechanisms between these two groups cannot achieve deep collaboration among TPs; it must be complemented by collaborative external policy adjustments such as government subsidy funds and green incentives. Such deep collaboration among TPs emphasizes the substantive enhancement of coordination efficiency and cooperative quality on the basis of full participation, reflecting the maturity and effectiveness of three-player innovation interaction. (4) Default penalties and the returns from CEs’ independent R&D constitute, respectively, the rigid constraint mechanism and the market-driven mechanism for collaborative innovation in GIBTs. Working in tandem, one exerting a restraining effect and the other a stimulating effect, they jointly regulate the cooperative behavior of CEs and ARIs, thereby resolving the dilemma of insufficient motivation for collaborative innovation in GIBTs. In terms of theoretical contributions, this study employs evolutionary game theory and numerical simulation methods to refine theories related to policy thresholds, differentiated incentives, collaborative governance, and the balance of benefits and risks among industry, ARIs. It also demonstrates that the underlying logic can serve as a reference for developing countries with similar industrial structures. In terms of practical contributions, this study recommends establishing subsidy allocation standards based on subsidy critical thresholds; implementing differentiated tax incentives for CEs, ARIs; scientifically designing R&D cost-sharing ratios; and improving mechanisms for penalty-based enforcement and incentives for independent R&D. Furthermore, it proposes advancing institutional development, policy implementation, and system optimization in a progressive manner, short-term, medium-term, and long-term, according to priority.