Evolutionary game analysis of cooperative technology upgrading in EV battery reverse supply chains

Achieving efficient recycling of end-of-life electric vehicle (EV) batteries requires both technology and strategic coordination among stakeholders. This study examines cooperative technological upgrading in EV battery recycling using evolutionary game theory. A bilateral model is developed to analyze strategic interactions between manufacturers and recyclers, and then extended to a tripartite framework by introducing government intervention. Numerical simulations and sensitivity analyses yield three main findings. First, initial strategy probabilities affect convergence speed but not long-run equilibria. Second, stable cooperation emerges only when the benefits of improved recyclability and recovery efficiency exceed upgrading costs. Third, government subsidies increase the willingness of firms to adopt technology upgrading strategies, while interfirm penalty and compensation mechanisms discourage passive and unilateral behavior. Higher cooperative benefits further reduce the dependence of firms on government support, thereby jointly improving incentive compatibility and system stability. The findings contribute to understanding cooperation mechanisms in battery reverse supply chains and provide insights for the design of effective recycling policies.