A puzzle of trust

There is a tension at the center of the trust literature. It is hard to understand the notion of trust without the notion of belief. Trust seems to require a belief in the trustworthiness of an agent with respect to the matter in question. Yet trust appears substantially different to belief, in particular it seems to be governed by different norms. The proper reasons governing belief seem to be exclusively evidential or alethic, while at least some of the proper reasons for trust are non-evidential. It seems we appropriately form and maintain trust despite lacking good evidence for doing so. We trust because it is good for our relationships, because we care for the trusted agent and respect them. Schleifer McCormick’s Belief as Emotion (2024) offers a way for us to defuse the tension. This paper examines Schleifer McCormick’s solution to the tension and argues that more parsimonious solutions are available. It is unclear just how useful Schleifer McCormick’s approach is.