There is no such thing as epistemic, aesthetic, athletic, zetetic, or even moral blame

Abstract Several philosophers have recently debated whether something called ‘epistemic blame’ exists. Others have proposed that there also exists ‘aesthetic blame’, ‘epistemic praise’, ‘epistemic atonement’, ‘epistemic hypocrisy’, and it isn’t hard to imagine others still arguing for the existence of things like ‘zetetic blame’ or ‘athletic blame’. This paper proposes that arguments from both realists and sceptics about such phenomena misunderstand the nature of blame and other components of our accountability practices. Although epistemic blame (etc.) sceptics are correct that epistemic blame does not exist, epistemic blame realists are correct that ‘moral blame’ is insufficient for helping make sense of our reactions to agents who violate epistemic norms. Once we understand that blame’s function is norm-enforcement simpliciter, we have no need to posit distinct forms of blame (praise, forgiveness, etc.). Despite seeming revisionary, the position maintains all the argumentative strengths of both realism and scepticism, with few drawbacks. It also renders our understanding of blame consistent with independently convincing accounts of epistemic normativity, and both epistemic and moral norms.