Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Paternalism in Non-Professional Interpreting

This paper investigates the occurrence of epistemic paternalism and epistemic injustice within the context of non-professional interpreting. Through a qualitative secondary analysis of previous interviews with non-professional interpreters, the study explores the manifestations of interference, non-consultation, and improvement conditions (as core concepts of epistemic paternalism) and of testimonial injustice, contributory injustice, and linguistic injustice. The results demonstrate that interpreters interfere in the interactions between dominantly situated individuals, such as institutional agents, and socio-epistemically marginalised people for their epistemic and non-epistemic good by managing the pace of communicative exchange, withholding information, modifying expressions, or offering additional contextual information. Notably, the findings concerning epistemic injustice reveal that interpreters can face testimonial injustice themselves, while they can also exercise epistemic injustice, even to the extent of silencing the disadvantaged individuals. The findings further suggest that the interfered-with party may simultaneously experience contributory and linguistic injustice, enacted by dominantly positioned agents through wilful hermeneutical ignorance and epistemic exclusion.