Relational Free Speech Reconsidered

Abstract In a recent article, Jonathan Seglow and Matteo Bonotti develop an interesting and original relational approach to free speech—one that grounds the value of (protecting) large swathes of speech in the relational need that we have for ‘recognition’ from those around us, and the role speech plays in facilitating recognition. Here, I argue that while their argument provides an exciting foundation for a relational free speech account, it may not be able to provide a stern rebuke to certain cases of censorship that we would want a free speech account to rebuke. I have in mind here cases where censorship will have little to no impact on an agent’s ability to give and receive meaningful recognition. In addition, like all relational accounts, their account relies on the idea that human beings are social animals with relational needs. But what their account does not provide, and what is indeed something of a lacuna in relational accounts more generally, is a sense of whether our social nature is a gift or a curse. Fortunately, we can respond to both problems by considering how speech facilitates other kinds of relational goods, beyond securing our need for recognition. By way of example, I discuss the integral role speech plays in enabling us to meet our moral duties to help those around us, and how this provides a relational argument for protecting certain kinds of speech that may not be protected by a narrower, recognition-based relational approach. But this is just one example in service of a more general lesson. It is sometimes said that the best kind of free speech argument would be of a ‘patchwork’ form—stitching together different free speech arguments in favour of protecting different kinds of speech (say a truth-based argument in favour of protecting academic speech, an intellectual autonomy-based argument for protecting artistic speech, and so on). It may be that we can stitch together a patchwork of purely relational arguments in order to provide an extensive, cohesive account of the value of speech. This is an exciting prospect for relational theorists. Still, to do this, we will need to attend to the full range of our relational needs and how they intertwine with speech.