The Punitive Dimension of Presidential Particularism

Existing accounts of presidential particularism emphasize the targeted distribution of benefits to electorally valuable constituencies. This research note demonstrates that presidential particularism can also operate punitively, through the selective imposition of costs on constituencies that provided weaker electoral support for the president. I examine this dynamic through the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), a highly centralized and politicized agency created at the start of Donald Trump’s second term. Leveraging data on nearly 700,000 federal contracts linked to DOGE contract cuts and 2024 county-level election returns, I show that these cuts were systematically concentrated in counties that provided weaker electoral support for Trump. These patterns hold across contract- and county-level analyses. Together, these findings broaden theories of presidential particularism by showing that presidents may use administrative authority to impose costs on electorally oppositional constituencies. More broadly, I demonstrate how presidents can wield administrative power as a tool of partisan punishment.