Моделювання кіберфізичних наслідків атак на канал вимірювання системи аеродинамічної левітації

The paper investigates the cyber-physical consequences of additive attacks on the measurement channel of an aerodynamic levitation system. The study was conducted within the activities of the Laboratory of Industrial Control Systems Security at Igor Sikorsky Kyiv Polytechnic Institute, where SCADA–PLC cyber-physical testbeds are used for education and research in secure control of critical industrial infrastructure facilities. The object of study is a nonlinear aerodynamic levitation process: a ball is suspended in a vertical airflow, its height is measured by a sensor, and a PLC-based closed-loop control system generates a command for the fan. The attacks considered do not directly modify the actuator command, but distort the measured height used by the controller and diagnostic software. For the analysis, a compact nonlinear model of the setup is used, accounting for the inertia of the actuator channel, the nonlinear dependence of the lift force on the effective airflow state, and the variation of aerodynamic action with the ball height in the vertical channel. Four scenarios of additive influence on the measurement channel are analyzed: constant bias, exponential disturbance, a packet of short PRBS-type pulses, and a harmonic disturbance with time-varying frequency. Simulation results show that plausible manipulation of measurements can cause significant physical deviations and oscillatory modes, while the corrupted signal may remain acceptable for conventional monitoring. The results confirm the need to ensure sensor-channel integrity and to use model-based residuals and robust fault diagnostics in secure control tasks.