Addressing Inequality or Sustainability? How Equal and Unequal Groups Use Endogenous Rule Changing to Manage Common Resources

ABSTRACT We investigate whether people can sustainably manage a shared resource when they are allowed to change the rules themselves (i.e., endogenously). In two preregistered studies (Study 1: N = 460; Study 2: N = 580), participants played a Common Resource Game in groups of four over 10 rounds. Each player could extract a limited share of the resource, i.e., the maximum extraction level (MEL). We manipulated two factors. First, groups were either equal (all players had the same MEL of 25%) or unequal (two players had higher limits, 33%, the other two had lower limits, 17%). Second, some groups could suggest and vote on new extraction limits after each round, while others could not. Participants were thus randomly allocated to four between‐subject conditions (2: Equal vs. Unequal MELs × 2: Voting vs. No Voting possibility), with an additional role distinction (high vs. low MEL players) within Unequal groups. Allowing groups to vote on new rules did not improve sustainable resource use. One reason might be that we observed limited use of the voting possibility. However, Unequal groups used the voting option more often than Equal groups. In these groups, players with lower MELs took action more often and did so earlier than those with higher MELs. Overall, although participants' suggestions seemed to strive to both increase sustainability and decrease inequality, they had little effect on actual resource use or profits. This suggests that allowing groups to change rules on their own may not be sufficient to ensure sustainable management of shared resources.