What Counts as a Stronger Cause? Six Meanings of Causal Importance in the Social Sciences

Philosophers have analyzed the meaning of binary causal statements (“A causes B”), yet many disputes in the social sciences concern a different question: the relative weight of causes, or what it means to claim that “A is more important than B in bringing about C.” This article argues that the ambiguity behind this claim underlies many stable disagreements between different schools of social scientists. Building on the philosophy of the social sciences and key examples from social-science practice, I distinguish six distinct meanings of causal strength: associational, contributional, difference-making, replacement, stability, and specificity. These meanings frequently yield conflicting verdicts about which cause is stronger. Moreover, each meaning is associated with a theory of causation, a family of methods, a characteristic vocabulary, and a metaphorical register. The article concludes with a plea for “causal literacy”: Making these meanings explicit will not dissolve all disagreement, but it may help separate true empirical from verbal disputes.