When do armed forces support or resist domestic policing tasks?

Abstract Civil–military relations scholars generally assume that senior military leaders (SMLs) tend to resist domestic policing tasks because they consider them an inappropriate role for the armed forces. However, evidence also shows that SMLs sometimes pragmatically support these duties to secure resources. This article proposes a theoretical framework that combines pragmatic considerations with military role conceptions to account for SMLs’ reactions to political demands for domestic policing missions. The framework suggests that SMLs approach these demands as part of a strategy to preserve organisational survival. Survival depends on maintaining a positive organisational equilibrium – the balance between what the organisation provides to its members and clients and what it demands of them. SMLs support domestic policing when it strengthens this equilibrium and resist it when it undermines it. The article tests this argument by examining Italian SMLs’ approach to operation Strade Sicure between 2008 and 2024, drawing primarily on qualitative discourse analysis of parliamentary hearings, official documents, and public statements, complemented by interviews with retired SMLs. The findings show that military support for domestic policing is conditional and reversible: it expands when such missions help stabilise organisational equilibrium under resource pressure and contracts once the personnel costs outweigh the political and financial benefits.